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and	 services,	 and	 creating	 a	 new,	 digital	 trade.	 Baldwin	 (2016a)	 calls	 it	 the	 4th	 phase	 of	
















































definition	 of	 what	 is	 understood	 by	 those	 terms.7	 Often,	 they	 are	 used	 interchangeably,	
without	defining	the	scope	of	each	concept.8	At	the	same	time,	the	WTO	has	not	been	able	to	
reach	consensus	on	a	final	definition	despite	ongoing	discussion	for	the	past	20	years.		
For	 the	 purpose	 of	 its	Work	 Programme	on	 Electronic	 Commerce,	 the	WTO	uses	 a	 broad	
working	definition	of	electronic	commerce.	It	understands	the	term	electronic	commerce	to	




















point	 out	 that	 no	monetary	 component	 would	 need	 to	 be	 involved	 for	 an	 activity	 to	 be	
classified	as	e-commerce	according	to	the	WTO’s	definition	as	only	the	electronic	delivery	of	





“[a]n	 e-commerce	 transaction	 is	 the	 sale	 or	 purchase	 of	 goods	 or	 services,	
conducted	 over	 computer	 networks	 by	 methods	 specifically	 designed	 for	 the	
purpose	of	receiving	or	placing	orders.	The	goods	or	services	are	ordered	by	those	
methods,	but	the	payment	and	the	ultimate	delivery	of	the	goods	or	services	do	
not	have	 to	be	 conducted	online.	An	e-commerce	 transaction	 can	be	between	




























internet	 (…)	 [including]	 selling	 goods	 online,	 offering	 online	 information	 or	 commercial	












of	 new	 developments	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 digital	 trade	 will	 need	 to	 be	 discussed,	 such	 as	
transactions	paid	for	with	data,	transactions	made	within	the	so-called	“sharing	economy”,	or	
machine	 to	 machine	 (M2M)	 communications.	 While	 some	 transactions	 generated	 within	








Fleuter	 (2016)	 disaggregates	 digital	 products	 into	 four	 categories:	 tangible	 goods	 ordered	
through	 the	 Internet,	electronically	delivered	services,	e-products	–	meaning	electronically	






















to	 determine	 if	 trade	 is	 digital	 or	 not,	 what	 would	 apply	 if	 incoming	 order-emails	 were	
assessed	 and	 processed	 by	 an	 artificial	 intelligence,	 instead	 of	 a	 human?	Would	 that	 be	
considered	digital	 trade?	Making	categories	based	on	different	uses	of	 the	 Internet	should	
therefore	be	 seen	with	 caution.	On	 the	other	 hand,	 the	OECD	also	highlights	 the	need	 to	
include	 information,	 or	 data,	 as	 new	 a	 dimension	 of	 international	 trade,	 since	 data	 is	 an	
essential	part	of	the	Internet	economy	and	for	supporting	monetary	transactions.	
Establishing	different	categories	of	digital	trade	products	and	services	is	important	to	clearly	
define	 the	 subject	 of	 this	 paper,	 and	 to	 also	 differentiate	 relatively	 new	 trade	 concepts	
(electronically	 transmitted	 products	 and	 services)	 from	 traditional,	 now	 digitally	 enabled,	
trade	concepts.	
This	 paper	will	mainly	 focus	 on	 cross-border	 transactions	 in	which	 products	 and	 services,	














Two	 main	 challenges	 can	 be	 identified	 when	 trying	 to	 quantify	 the	 impact	 of	 electronic	
commerce.	Given	the	absence	of	a	globally	accepted	definition	of	what	is	understood	by	the	







impossible,	 for	 governments	 or	 statisticians	 to	 count	 and	 analyse	 what	 kind	 of	 data	 is	
transmitted	across	borders	and	which	part	should	be	considered	to	be	trade.	On	the	other	
hand,	 there	 is	 the	 need	 for	 expanding	 the	 scope	 of	 traditional	 goods	 and	 services	 trade	
statistics	as	benefits	from	data	flows	are	not	fully	covered.21	







to-government	 (B2G)	 transactions,	 as	 well	 as	 consumer-to-consumer	 (C2C)	 (e.g.	 eBay),	
consumer-to-business	(C2B)	(e.g.	in	the	sharing	economy	like	Airbnb,	where	people	provide	
their	 home	 to	 Airbnb	 for	 the	 platform	 to	 rent	 it),	 government-to-consumer	 (G2C)	 (e.g.	








It	 is	 therefore	 necessary	 to	 analyse	 different	 dimensions	 of	 digital	 trade	 when	 trying	 to	
compile	statistics	about	its	growth	or	impact.23	To	be	aware	of	what	kind	of	data	is	included,	













































For	 the	same	year,	Manyika	et	al.	 (2016),	 in	a	 report	published	by	McKinsey,	estimate	the	
volume	 of	 cross	 border	 B2C	 e-commerce	 (in	 this	 case	 meaning	 all	 products	 and	 services	




rapid	 growth	 of	 cross-border	 e-commerce	 in	 goods	 and	 services:	McKinsey	 estimates	 the	









EU	 Internet	users	purchased	goods	or	 services	online,	40	percent	more	 than	 in	2007.34	33	

















increase	of	 flows	 in	data	as	shown	in	figure	3,	represented	by	cross-border	bandwidths.	 In	
2014,	cross-border	bandwidth	was	45	times	higher	than	in	2005,	while	the	growth	in	flows	of	
goods	(10.5	times),	services	(3.1	times),	foreign	direct	investment	(2.3	times),	and	people	(1.6	
times)	 was	 significantly	 lower.36	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 not	 all	 of	 this	 data	 can	 be	





















a	 need	 for	 improved	 statistics	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 impact	 of	 digital	 trade	 in	 the	
economy.38	As	 the	WTO	states	 in	 its	most	 recent	 statistical	 review:	“The	challenge	 for	 the	
international	 statistical	 community	 is	 to	 find	 a	 way	 of	 capturing	 these	 [digital	 trade]	
transactions	 in	 international	 trade	 statistics	 and	 subsequently	 in	 macroeconomic	
aggregates.”39	While	there	are	already	a	number	of	initiatives	working	on	this	issue,	such	as	










Before	 analysing	 measures	 implemented	 by	 governments	 that	 directly	 address	 digitally	
transmitted	products	and	services,	some	factors	are	noteworthy	to	mention	that	have	a	direct	
or	 indirect	 impact	on	the	development	on	digital	trade.	However,	these	will	not	be	further	
analysed	 in	 this	 paper	 as	 they	 do	 not	 constitute	measures	 implemented	 by	 governments	
restricting	digital	trade	directly.		
These	 include	barriers	 to	 classical	 trade	 in	 information	 technology	 (IT)	 equipment	 such	 as	















economies,	 of	which	 some	 are	 also	 valid	 for	 advanced	 economies.42	 The	 first	 category	 he	
identifies	 is	 “economic	 barriers”,	 including	 slow	 or	 no	 access	 to	 the	 Internet,	 bad	










This	 non-exhaustive	 list	 illustrates	 the	 numerous	 challenges	 countries	 are	 facing	 when	
participating	in	global	digital	trade.	While	some	barriers	might	be	overcome	within	the	next	
years,	such	as	lack	of	electric	supply	or	access	to	the	Internet,	others,	such	as	weakness	of	
formal	 institutions,	 might	 need	 longer,	 possibly	 leading	 to	 disadvantages	 for	 developing	
economies.		















rules	mainly	elaborated	by	advanced	economies,	will	 impede	 their	 further	development.46	
Even	though	this	issue	will	not	be	the	focus	of	this	paper,	the	importance	of	overcoming	those	











a	 negative	 impact	 on	 digital	 trade.	 Some	 of	 these	 trade-restrictive	 barriers	 are	 similar	 to	
measures	 that	 can	 be	 identified	 in	 classical	 trade	 in	 goods	 and	 services,	 while	 others	 are	
unique	to	electronic	commerce.	The	motives	for	implementing	such	measures	are	various	and	



















and	 services.49	 This	 is	 mostly	 due	 to	 three	 reasons:	 first,	 digital	 trade50	 includes	 mostly	
services,	 where	 tariffs	 in	 a	 classical	 sense	 have	 never	 been	 a	 big	 issue.	 Second,	 it	 is	 still	
technically	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	control	all	cross-border	flows	of	data	and	therefore	
impose	 tariffs	 on	 electronically	 transmitted	 products	 and	 services.	 And	 third,	 the	 WTO	
currently	holds	a	moratorium	on	custom	duties	on	digitally	transmitted	products	and	services	































Several	 economies	 are	 considering	 implementing	 or	 have	 already	 implemented	 data	
localization	requirements,	 including	the	EU,	Korea,	Russia,	and	Turkey.	Cory	 identifies	data	
localization	measures	in	a	total	of	31	countries	and	the	EU54.	This	number	illustrates	that	many	
countries	 are	 considering	 some	kind	of	 “data	protectionism”55,	 even	 though	 the	extent	of	
existing	data	localization	measures	and	their	impact	on	digital	trade	is	not	yet	fully	clear.56		
The	main	reasons	evoked	for	implementation	are	the	protection	of	privacy	of	citizens	(such	as	






Another	 example	 of	 economic	 protectionism	 could	 be	 Kazakhstan,	 requiring	 all	 websites	
registered	with	a	.kz-domain	to	operate	on	servers	located	within	the	country.61			
In	 Turkey,	 Internet-based	 payment	 providers,	 like	 PayPal,	 must	 store	 all	 data	 within	 the	
country	for	ten	years,	which,	inter	alia,	made	PayPal	exit	the	country.62		
The	 impact	 of	 data	 localization	 requirements	 on	 the	 economy	 is	 not	marginal:	 the	 USITC	





















agriculture.	 A	 study	 published	by	 the	 European	Centre	 for	 International	 Political	 Economy	
(ECIPE)	comes	to	the	result	that	in	a	scenario	with	economy-wide	data	localization	measures	
applying	 to	 all	 sectors,	 GDP-losses	 would	 be	 substantial	 in	 countries	 analysed,	 with	 -1.1	
percent	 in	 the	 EU	 and	 South	 Kora,	 -0.8	 percent	 in	 Brazil	 and	 India,	 and	 -0.7	 percent	 in	
Indonesia.64		
3.2.4	Quotas	
There	 are	 no	 cited	 cases	 quotas	 in	 the	 classical	 sense	 regarding	 the	 supply	 of	 digitally	








































(similar	 to	 Facebook	 and	 WhatsApp)	 or	 Baidu	 (similar	 to	 Google),	 giving	 China	 and	 its	
companies	an	advantage	in	the	global	economy.70	With	its	successful	implementation	of	web	











lawful	 international	 trade	 as	 some	 websites	 might	 be	 non-commercial,	 such	 as	 personal	















have	 a	 direct	 commercial	 activity	 involved	with	 the	 final	 consumer,	 such	 as	 Facebook,	 or	
WhatsApp,	but	where	consumers	“pay”	with	their	data	(in	the	case	of	Facebook,	monetary	
transactions	are,	however,	involved	between	the	platform	and	companies	advertising	on	the	
platform).	 Given	 that	 data	 is	 often	 cited	 to	 be	 an	 essential	 resource	 in	 the	 21st	 century,	
blocking	 and	 filtering	 of	 websites	 and	 apps	 which	 generate	 “data	 revenue”	 (rather	 than	
“monetary	revenue”)	monetized	at	a	later	stage	in	the	value	chain	should	also	be	considered	
to	be	a	barrier	to	digital	trade.	






























the	measure	 is	only	 in	effect	since	very	recently,	 it	 is	yet	unclear	how	 it	will	affect	 foreign	







Web	 filtering	and	blocking	also	poses	 restrictions	 to	 the	access	 to	 the	 Internet.	Due	 to	 its	

































Given	 that	 elimination	 of	 net	 neutrality	 in	 the	 US	 has	 been	 very	 recent	 and	 developing	
economies,	where	net	neutrality	is	sometimes	de	facto	non-existent,	are	often	no	important	








products,	 and	 digital	 products	 and	 services,	 like	 software	 or	 technical	 services	 under	 the	






Another	example	 to	be	named	with	 regard	 to	economic	protectionism	 is	 India,	where	 the	
government	introduced	an	“equalization	levy”,	posing	an	additional	6	percent	withholding	tax	























Internet	economy,	and	 therefore	also	digital	 trade,	depends,	 to	a	certain	degree,	on	open	
innovation	 and	 open	 source	 codes.	 IPRs	 that	 are	 too	 strict	 can,	 therefore,	 equally	 pose	 a	




Many	 companies	 use	 geoblocking	 to	 restrict	 access	 to	 content	 in	 a	 certain	 territory.	









While	 eliminating	 company-induced	 geoblocking	 barriers	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 positive	 from	 a	
consumer	perspective,	companies	can	see	this	as	an	additional	barrier	to	trade:	to	strengthen	
the	Single	Digital	Market,	the	EU	recently	eliminated	what	it	calls	“unjustified	geoblocking”90,	
hence,	 forcing	 companies	 to	provide	equal	 access	 to	 content	 for	 all	 consumers	within	 the	
European	Union,	strengthening	the	rights	of	consumers.	US	companies,	on	the	other	hand,	















































counteract	 falls	 in	 communication	 costs,	 points	 out	 in	 relation	 to	 free	 flows	 of	 data	 and	
communication	that	at	least	in	the	G7	countries,	“the	instinct	for	an	open	society	is	stronger	
than	 any	 protectionist	 instinct	 that	 is	 likely	 to	 arise.”95	 This	 statement,	 however,	 seems	
questionable	 when	 having	 in	 mind	 the	 broad	 spectrum	 of	 barriers	 to	 digital	 trade	
governments	are	 starting	 to	 implement,	 including	 the	G7,	 as	well	 as	 the	 recently	 changed	







recognizing	 the	 growing	 importance	of	 digital	 trade	 creating	 new	opportunities.	 The	WTO	















dedicated	 biannual	 discussions	 on	 cross-cutting	 issues.	 However,	 deliverables	 of	 those	
debates	have	been	limited	as	differences	between	Member	States	are	substantial.97		










due	 to	 Member	 States	 having	 diverging	 opinions	 on	 key	 issues	 of	 electronic	 commerce	
including	on	how	discussions	should	take	place.101	Some	have	stated	needing	more	time	to	
internally	evaluate	 the	 impact	of	digital	 trade,	while	others	have	not	 taken	 interest	 in	 the	





Members	went	beyond	 the	exploratory	nature	of	 the	Work	Programme	and	were	 looking	



























main	 controversies	 between	 Member	 States	 as	 well	 as	 among	 scholars.	 With	 regard	 to	
classification	of	cross	border	digital	trade,	two	of	the	main	WTO	agreements	are	potentially	
of	relevance:	the	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	(GATT)	and	the	General	Agreement	
on	 Trade	 in	 Services	 (GATS).	 While	 trade	 related	 IPRs	 are	 also	 an	 important	 issue	 when	
analysing	digital	trade	within	the	WTO	framework,	this	paper	will	not	focus	on	these	aspects	




























products	 and	 services,	 and	 especially	 of	 electronically	 transmitted	 products	 and	 services,	
seems	 to	 bring	 the	 need	 for	 definition,	 as	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 2,	 and	 clarification	 in	
classification.	At	 this	point,	 it	 is	unclear	what	WTO	regime	should	be	applied,	especially	 in	
regard	to	digitally	delivered	products	and	services.111		
While	the	WTO	is	struggling	to	clarify	the	issue	of	classification,	fast	technological	change	has	
even	outdated	parts	 of	 the	discussion.	One	example	of	 this	 is	 if	 software	delivered	on	 an	













Scholars	 widely	 agree	 that	 goods	 ordered	 or	 payed	 for	 via	 the	 internet	 but	 delivered	 in	
tangible	form	still	remain	goods	for	the	purposes	of	the	GATT	when	crossing	the	border,	while	
traditionally	 delivered	 services	 (including	 remote	delivery)	 ordered	 via	 the	 internet	 clearly	
remain	subject	to	the	GATS.113		















Remotely	 supplied	 digital	 services	 are	 encompassed	 by	 the	 GATS,	 given	 its	 technological	









existing	moratorium	 on	 applying	 custom	 duties	 on	 electronic	 transmission	 can	 further	 be	
valued	in	the	light	of	applying	GATT	rules	to	digitally	transmitted	products	as	custom	duties	
are	not	an	issue	within	the	GATS	framework.	






















(given	 that	 software	 today	 is	 often	 supplied	 electronically	 and	 no	 restrictions	 on	 how	 the	
software	has	to	be	supplied	(e.g.	in	physical	form)	have	been	made	in	the	Panel	report).	If	this	
is	the	case,	the	Panel	would	have	treated	digital	products	like	their	physical	counterparts	by	
applying	 GATT	 rules	 to	 them.	 The	 still	 outstanding	 Appellate	 Body	 Report	 might	 bring	










and	 services	 as	 services	 under	 the	GATS.121	 Arguments	 include	 that	 a	 product	was	 rather	




























like-services	 (ruled	 by	 the	 GATS).	 A	 service	 therefore	 can	 legally	 not	 be	 a	 like-product	 in	
reference	to	a	good	or	vice	versa.		
Even	though	this	question	could	be	solved	from	a	 legal-perspective	 if	all	digitally	delivered	
products	were	 to	be	 services,	 it	 still	 poses	 challenges	 in	practice	 as	 this	 leads	 to	different	
treatment,	e.g.	for	music	delivered	on	a	CD	and	music	downloaded,	in	terms	of	market	access	
and	national	 treatment	–	 a	question,	 the	WTO	will	 possibly	have	 to	deal	with	 in	 the	near	
future.		
4.2.4	Neither	products	nor	services	–	a	sui	generis?	







doubt,	e-commerce	blurs	 the	 line	between	what	 traditionally	was	considered	to	be	simply	
goods	and	services.		
However,	 when	 aiming	 to	 solve	 the	 issue	 of	 classification	 of	 e-commerce,	 and	 especially	















that	 potentially	 new	 agreement	 was	 originally	 meant	 to	 avoid.	 Also,	 negotiating	 a	 new	
agreement	solely	for	digital	trade	would	pose	the	risk	being	more	restrictive	than	existing	rules	








Emerging	 technologies	 will	 challenge	 the	 existing	 WTO	 framework	 additionally,	 such	 as	
additive	manufacturing.	In	1998,	the	WTO	Secretariat,	 in	a	note	to	the	Council	for	Trade	in	
Services,	 stressed	 that	 “of	 course	 it	 would	 be	 impossible	 to	 deliver	 a	 tangible	 product	
electronically.”131	This	statement	is	not	quite	obvious	anymore.	Baldwin	(2016a)	notes	that	




































Brazil	 –	 Taxation	 and	 its	 possible	 subsequent	 implications.	 Further	 research	 on	 the	
applicability	of	GATT	rules	to	digital	trade	will	be	necessary.		




It	 includes	 two	 sets	 of	 basic	 obligations	 for	Members:	 first,	 General	Obligations,	 including	
most-favoured	 nation	 (MFN)-treatment	 (article	 II),	 prohibiting	 to	 discriminate	 between	
Members,	 as	 well	 as	 transparency	 (article	 III),	 automatically	 applying	 to	 all	 Members	 in	
relation	 to	all	 services	covered	by	 the	GATS.	And	second,	Specific	Commitments	 regarding	




designated	 by	 Member	 States	 in	 their	 individual	 schedules	 of	 commitments.	 Potentially,	
provisions	 on	 domestic	 regulation	 (art.	 VI)	 disciplines	 also	 apply	 to	 all	 services	 for	 which	















products	 and	 services	 delivered	 via	 the	 Internet	 has	 created	 incentives	 for	 providers	 to	
establish	 their	 service	 where	 it	 is	 best	 advantageous,	 for	 instance,	 in	 terms	 of	 cost	 or	
legislation.140		




















not	 even	 employ	 the	 driver,	 but	 operates	 an	 app	 where	 clients	 can	 order	 an	 “Uber”,	 a	
transportation	service.	If	a	client	orders	an	Uber	via	this	app,	the	transportation	service	will	
take	place	in	one	country.	Other	services,	like	the	matching	service	via	the	app,	the	payment	
for	 the	 driver	 by	 Uber,	 or	 the	 insurance	 are	 potentially	 provided	 from	 another	 country.	
Depending	 on	 the	 classification	 of	 the	 service	 Uber	 provides,	 it	 operates	 under	 different	
modes	 of	 supply	 of	 the	 GATS.	 If	 classified	 as	 a	 transportation	 service,	 it	 is,	 according	 the	
argumentation	used	by	the	OECD,	operating	under	GATS	mode	3,	while	when	classified	as	a	
business	service,	it	is	operating	remotely	(mode1).142	The	2008	System	of	National	Accounts	

































digital	 trade,	 even	 those	 that	 were	 formerly	 non-tradeable,	 or	 at	 least	 non-tradeable	
remotely.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 is	 a	 number	 of	 new	 services,	 such	 as	 search	 engines,	
mobile	 applications,	 or	 cloud	 computing,	 for	 which	 clarification	 is	 needed	 where	 those	
services	fit	within	the	existing	UN	Central	Product	Classification	(CPC)148,	on	which	the	WTO	
Services	Sectoral	Classification	list	is	based.		






as	 telecommunications,	 media,	 financial	 services,	 retail,	 education,	 healthcare,	 business	
services,	as	well	as	data	services.		
This	 can	 have	 serious	 implications	 for	 Members	 when	 scheduling	 was	 undertaken	 at	 a	
moment	when	the	service	scheduled	was	essentially	different	from	today.	
This	 can	 be	 illustrated	 by	 the	 WTO	 dispute	 settlement	 case	 China	 –	 Publications	 and	
Audiovisual	Products:151	the	US	accused	China	of	posing	limitations	to	market	access	as	well	






















services	by	the	time	 it	undertook	 its	commitments.	However,	 the	Appellate	Body	assumed	
that	using	generic	terms	in	the	GATS	schedules	evidences	the	convincement	of	Members	for	
technology	to	change	over	time.155		
In	 this	 regard,	 again,	 the	 case	 US	 –	 Gambling	 can	 be	 cited	 in	 which	 the	 intra-modal	
technological	neutrality	of	the	GATS	was	pointed	out156,	thus,	confirming	its	applicability	in	
regard	 to	 new	 technologies.	 In	 the	 case	 China	 –	 Publications	 and	 Audiovisual	 Products	
applicability	in	regard	to	new	technologies	was	confirmed	again,	even	though	the	Appellate	
Body	used	a	different	argumentation.157		
With	 the	 intra-modal	 technological	neutrality	of	 the	GATS	and	 the	use	of	generic	 terms	 in	
Members’	schedules,	the	GATS	seems	to	be	equipped	to	respond	to	technological	changes.	
This	means,	on	the	other	hand,	Members	would	have	to	re-evaluate	and,	if	needed,	modify	
their	 specific	 schedules	 if	 due	 to	 technological	 change	 original	 market	 access	 or	 national	















both	 subsectors	 within	 “Computer	 and	 Related	 Services”	 which	 falls	 under	 “Business	
Services”.	However,	not	all	cross-border	data	flows	can	be	clearly	defined	as	a	service	involving	











delivered	 products	 and	 services	 as	 shown	 above,	 this	 section	 aims	 to	 analyse	 if	 the	GATS	






















Data	 localization	 measures	 requiring	 the	 establishment	 of	 local	 infrastructure	 directly	 or	
indirectly	 (prohibition	 of	 cross	 border	 data	 flows),	 and	 consequently	 local	 presence	 of	 a	





An	 indication	 for	 Members’	 intention	 can	 be	 found	 in	 paragraph	 5(c)	 of	 the	 Annex	 on	
Telecommunications,	stating	that	“each	Member	shall	ensure	(…)	movement	of	information	
within	 and	 across	 borders,	 including	 for	 intra-corporate	 communications	 of	 such	 service	
suppliers,	and	for	access	to	information	contained	in	data	bases	[sic!]	or	otherwise	stored	in	
machine-readable	form	in	the	territory	of	any	Member.”164	This	can	be	seen	as	an	indicator	







to	 establish	 infrastructure	 in	 its	 own	 territory	 will	 come	 at	 additional	 costs	 for	 those	




























various	 provisions	 of	 the	 GATS.	 In	 the	 first	 place,	 prohibiting	 the	 supply	 of	 a	 service,	 by	
blocking	or	filtering	the	supplier’s	website,	could	be	interpreted	in	the	light	of	article	XVI:2(a)	
and	(b)	in	sectors	where	commitments	have	been	undertaken.	This	would	also	be	the	case	if	
a	 service,	 such	 as	 access	 to	 a	 social	 network,	 is	 supplied	 on	 a	 non-monetary	 basis	 to	 the	
consumers,	 but	 rather	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 “paid	 with	 data”	 as	 GATS	 does	 not	 specify	 that	 a	
monetary	 transaction	 needs	 to	 be	 involved.	 However,	 as	 those	 “free	 to	 use”	 services	 are	
usually	monetized	 through	advertising,	 the	question	arises	how	a	case	 like	blocking	of	 the	



















China’s	 commitments	 undertaken	 in	 Telecommunications	 and	 Value-added	 Services,	
including	electronic	mail,	 voice	mail,	 and	electronic	data	 interchange	 in	 regard	 to	national	
treatment,	where	no	limitations	are	included	in	the	Chinese	schedule.170	
Web	blocking	 and	 filtering	 could	 also	 violate	MFN-obligations	 (art.	 II),	 if	measures	 applied	
accord	less	favourable	treatment	to	services	or	service	suppliers	from	one	Member	State	in	




neutrality,	 three	 additional	 agreements	 to	 the	 GATS	 should	 be	mentioned:	 the	 Annex	 on	
Telecommunications,	the	4th	protocol	to	the	GATS,	and	the	Reference	Paper.171	
The	Annex	on	Telecommunications	 recognizes	 the	essential	 nature	of	 telecommunications	
services	 for	 trade	 in	 services	 and	 ensures	 access	 to	 telecom	 networks	 and	 basic	 telecom	
services	for	the	supply	of	scheduled	services,	regardless	if	basic	telecommunications	services	
have	 been	 scheduled.172	 	 Hence,	 the	 Annex	 on	 Telecommunications	 provides	 essential	
protection	against	restrictions	for	access	to	telecommunications-infrastructure	and	services	
in	the	sectors	where	commitments	have	been	undertaken.		
The	 4th	 protocol	 to	 the	 GATS	 includes	 provisions	 on	 commitments	 by	 Member	 States	 to	
liberalize	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 basic	 telecommunication	 services,	 including	 data	
transmission,	 however,	 only	 for	 scheduled	 services.173	 The	 Reference	 Paper,	 on	 the	 other	
hand,	 includes	 some	 key	 principles	 for	 net	 neutrality,	 including	 transparency	 and	 non-
































light	 of	 national	 treatment	 commitments	 for	 scheduled	 services	 (art.	 XVII:3):	 forcing	













As	 IPRs	 are	 essentially	 addressed	 by	 the	 TRIPS	 agreement,	 geoblocking	 undertaken	 by	
governments	can	be	interpreted	in	the	same	regard	as	web	blocking	and	filtering,	and	Internet	
governance	related	topics	do	not	fall	under	the	main	scope	of	the	WTO,	those	issues	will	not	







second,	 comply	with	 the	 chapeau	of	 article	 XIV.	 Two	of	 the	most	 cited	 exceptions	will	 be	
analysed	in	the	following.		
The	protection	of	public	moral	and	maintaining	the	public	order	(as	outlined	 in	art.	XIV(a):	
necessary	 to	 protect	 public	 morals	 or	 to	maintain	 public	 order)	 is	 one	 of	 the	 often-cited	
arguments	for	implementing	quotas	as	well	as	measures	for	blocking	and	filtering	of	websites.	
Thus,	 it	has	been	referred	to	 in	 two	WTO	dispute	settlement	cases	related	to	digital	 trade	
already.	In	the	WTO	dispute	settlement	cases	US	–	Gambling	as	well	as	China	–	Publications	
and	Audiovisual	Products,	the	Appellate	Body	upheld	the	argumentation	of	prohibiting	certain	
digital	 services	 to	 protect	 public	 morals.	 However,	 in	 the	 case	 China	 –	 Publications	 and	
Audiovisual	Products,	it	was	made	clear	that	this	exception	could	not	be	evoked	for	banning	
services	 (in	 that	 case,	 inter	 alia,	 digital	 distribution	of	 books	 and	movies)	 in	 a	widespread	
general	manner,	but	had	to	be	applied	based	on	individual	circumstances.176	 It	can	also	be	
noted	that	compliance	with	the	chapeau	of	article	XIV	is	questionable,	especially	in	in	regard	
to	 web	 blocking	 and	 filtering	 in	 an	 arbitrary	 manner,	 leading	 to	 possible	 de	 facto	
discrimination	between	Members.	
In	the	case	of	data	localization	requirements,	the	data	privacy	of	citizens	(art.	XIV(c)ii)	is	one	
of	 the	 most	 mentioned	 reasons	 for	 implementation	 of	 such	 requirements.	 However,	 its	







could	access	data	or	 force	companies	by	 legislation	 to	 share	data	 if	data	 is	 stored	 in	 their	
territory.	But	even	if	data	is	stored	within	national	territory,	foreign	governments	can	force	
their	domestic	based	companies	to	give	them	access	to	data	stored	abroad	as	the	case	of	the	

















of	 interests	and	openness	of	 the	 internet.	While	the	GATS	might	grant	WTO	Members	the	
opportunity	to	restrict	certain	activities	in	their	territory,	this	might	also	limit	the	possibilities	
of	 their	 citizens	and	companies	 to	participate	 in	 the	 international	digital	economy.	On	 the	
other	hand,	as	the	recent	scandal	regarding	Facebook	and	Cambridge	Analytica	has	shown,	














When	 applied	 to	 existing	 barriers,	 it	 was	 shown	 that	 GATS	 rules	 already	 address	 most	












no	 other	 results	 have	 been	 conveyed,	 yet.	 Since	 the	 launch	 of	 the	Work	 Programme	 on	
Electronic	Commerce,	Ministers	of	Member	States	have	included	language	on	e-commerce	in	
most	of	their	Ministerial	Decisions	made	at	Ministerial	Conferences	(MCs).	However,	content	
of	 those	Decisions,	 so	 far,	 has	 been	 limited	 as	 they	 contain	 only	 the	minimum	 consensus	
reached	by	Members	in	regard	to	electronic	commerce.		
The	 Geneva	Ministerial	 Declaration	 on	 global	 electronic	 commerce	 of	 1998	 called	 for	 the	
establishment	 of	 a	 comprehensive	 work	 programme	 by	 the	 General	 Council	 as	 outlined	
earlier.	 The	 Declaration	 also	 established	 a	 moratorium	 on	 custom	 duties	 on	 electronic	
transmissions,	stating	that	“[w]ithout	prejudice	to	the	outcome	of	the	work	programme	or	







bodies,	 Ministers	 acknowledged	 that	 “electronic	 commerce	 creates	 new	 challenges	 and	
opportunities	 for	 trade	 for	Members	at	all	 stages	of	development”182	and	 recognized	“the	












more	 generic	 language	 on	 “development-related	 issues”.	 Ministers	 also	 instructed	 the	
General	 Council	 to	 consider	 recommendations	 on	 possible	measures	 related	 to	 electronic	
commerce	which	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 first	 step	 towards	widening	 the	mandate	 of	 the	Work	
Programme	towards	exploring	possibilities	for	rule	making.	
The	2013	Bali	Ministerial	Decision	has	been	the	broadest	in	its	scope	so	far.	While	maintaining	
some	 language	of	 the	2011	Ministerial	Decision,	Ministers	added	 language	on	 technology-
related	 issues,	 stating	 that	 “the	Work	 Programme	 should	 continue	 to	 examine	 the	 trade	
related	aspects	of,	inter	alia,	enhancing	internet	connectivity	and	access	to	information	and	
telecommunications	technologies	and	public	internet	sites,	the	growth	of	mobile	telephony,	
electronically	 delivered	 software,	 cloud	 computing,	 the	 protection	 of	 confidential	 data,	












language	was	added.	 The	2013	Decision	equally	maintains	 tasking	 for	 the	General	Council	
related	to	considering	recommendations	on	possible	measures	regarding	e-commerce,	and	
upholds	 the	 moratorium	 on	 custom	 duties,	 thus	 underscoring	 the	 will	 of	 Ministers	 to	
substantially	advance	on	this	issue.	This	interpretation	is	supported	by	the	2013	report	of	the	
General	 Council	 submitted	 to	 Ministers	 prior	 to	 MC9,	 stressing	 that	 “delegations	





























As	 outlined	 at	multiple	 points	 in	 this	 paper,	 opinions	 of	Members	 regarding	 the	 different	
aspects	 of	 electronic	 commerce	 are	 very	 diverse,	 consequently	 having	 led	 to	 hardly	 any	
progress	achieved	within	the	Work	Programme,	despite	ongoing	discussions	for	20	years.	The	





forwarded	 to	Ministers.193	 Draft	 Decisions	 have	 been	 submitted	 by	 the	 African	 Group194,	
Bangladesh,	China,	the	EU	and	co-sponsors,	India,	Japan	and	co-sponsors,	Russia,	as	well	as	
Singapore	and	co-sponsors.	Interestingly,	no	proposal	has	been	submitted	by	the	US	under	its	
new	 administration.	 Efforts	 of	 the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 General	 Council	 to	 bridge	 differences	
between	proposals	have	not	been	successful	as	proposals	included	a	wide	range	of	different	




Four	 delegations	 and	 their	 co-sponsors	 called	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 new	 forum	 for	
discussions	to	advance	the	digital	trade	agenda	of	the	WTO.	The	European	Union	and	its	co-


















assessment	 of	 whether	 clarification	 and	 strengthening	 of	 current	 WTO	 rules	 regarding	
electronic	 commerce	 was	 necessary,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 identification	 of	 priority	 needs	 for	
developing	countries.198	China,	in	addition	to	maintaining	the	current	discussions	under	the	
General	 Council,	 proposed	 to	 establish	 a	 forum	 for	 horizontal	 “Dedicated	Discussions”	 on	
issues	 such	 as	 facilitation	 of	 cross	 border	 digital	 trade.199	 The	 four	 other	 draft	Ministerial	
Decisions,	however,	only	reiterated	maintaining	the	current	overall	working	structure	of	the	
Work	Programme.	
Three	 draft	 Ministerial	 Decisions	 raised	 concerns	 in	 relation	 to	 maintaining	 the	 customs	
moratorium	 on	 electronic	 submissions,	 despite	 the	 moratorium	 being	 one	 of	 the	 few	































global	 trade,204	 issued	 a	 Joint	 Statement,	 stating	 to	work	more	 closely	 together	 on	 trade-
related	aspects	of	electronic	commerce	by	 initiating	exploratory	work	towards	future	WTO	
negotiations.205		
The	 initiative	 was	 mostly	 supported	 by	 advanced	 economies.	 Only	 some	 emerging	 and	
developing	economies	have	joined	and	of	all	LDCs,	only	Lao	People’s	Democratic	Republic	and	
Cambodia	have	signed	the	statement.206	Low	participation	among	developing	countries	in	this	
declaration	 is	 interesting	 to	 note,	 given	 the	 before	mentioned	 discussions:	 some	 scholars	
point	out	that	especially	SMEs	from	developing	economies	and	LDCs	will	benefit	most	from	
digitalization	 of	 the	 trade.207	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	many	 developing	 economies	 themselves	
state	that	they	are	currently	still	 in	the	process	of	evaluating	the	implications	of	the	digital	
economy	 and	 do	 not	 want	 to	 be	 part	 of	 any	 agreement	 that	 later	 might	 come	 as	 a	



































Critics	 of	 this	 Joint	 Statement,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 emphasize	 the	 need	 to	 clarify	 open	
questions	with	relevance	for	all	Members,	such	as	the	technological	neutrality	of	the	GATS,	
application	of	GATS	modes	1	or	2,	as	well	as	classification	of	digitally	delivered	products,	on	a	





issues	 related	 to	digital	 trade,	 including	data	 localization	measures,	 transparency,	 and	 the	
need	for	regulation	in	this	area.214		
However,	 there	 has	 been	 no	 breakthrough	 that	 would	 suggest	 that	 a	 final	 agreement	 is	















The	WTO	 established	 its	Work	 Programme	 on	 Electronic	 Commerce	 in	 1998,	 at	 the	 very	
beginning	of	the	rise	of	the	digital	economy.	Thus,	it	cannot	be	stated	that	the	organization	
has	overslept	the	beginning	of	digitalization	of	trade.		
Despite	 recognizing	 the,	 at	 that	 time,	 new	 phenomena	 from	 an	 early	 stage	 on,	 the	






answer	 yet.216	 In	 the	 first	 place,	 a	 clear	 definition	 of	 what	 is	 understood	 by	 the	 term	 e-
commerce	 as	 well	 as	 a	 clear	 statement	 regarding	 classification	 of	 digitally	 transmitted	




GATS	 rules	 could	 be	 useful	 to	 address	 these	 barriers.	 This	 paper	 has	 shown	 that	 GATS	
provisions	already	address	most	barriers	to	digital	trade.	This	is,	inter	alia,	relevant	in	regard	
to	market	access,	national	treatment,	possible	domestic	regulation	provisions,	and	the	GATS	
general	 exceptions.	 Also,	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 Annex	 on	 Telecommunications,	 the	 4th	
Protocol	to	the	GATS,	and	the	Reference	paper	to	the	digital	economy	has	not	been	clearly	
confirmed	yet	and	should	therefore	be	clarified.	
Against	 this	 backdrop,	 different	 variables	 can	 be	 identified	 that	 may	 have	 impeded	
progress.217	Those	variables	should	only	serve	as	indicators	at	this	point,	further	research	on	
causality	would	be	necessary	 to	analyse	 the	effects	of	 the	different	variables	on	 the	Work	
Programme.			







round	 is	 another	barrier	which	not	only	 impedes	progress	 in	 related	 trade	areas,	 but	 also	
questions	the	WTO	as	an	institution,	due	to	a	lack	of	deliverables	and	puts	further	burdens	on	
negotiations	within	the	WTO	in	general.218		
Another	 issue	to	be	highlighted	 is	how	the	Work	Programme	operates.	Work	 is	conducted	
within	the	respective	bodies	on	an	explorative	basis.	The	bodies	report	to	the	General	Council	
which	 then	 reports	 to	Ministers,	 currently	every	 two	years.	No	 real	 forum	 for	permanent,	
more	 frequent,	 or	 more	 flexible	 discussions	 has	 been	 established.	 In	 the	 current,	 fast-
developing,	environment	of	the	Internet	economy,	two	years	can	be	a	substantial	amount	of	





Work	 Programme	 does	 not	 have	 a	 mandate	 to	 work	 towards	 rule-making	 but	 is	 only	 of	
exploratory	 nature.220	 When	 the	 Work	 Programme	 was	 established	 however,	 a	 clearer	
mandate	could	have	been	given,	for	example	clearly	stating	that	one	deliverable	should	be	to	
identify	barriers	and	ways	the	WTO	can	address	them.	A	clear	mandate	from	the	beginning	on	
might	 have	 led	 to	 more	 focused	 work	 within	 the	 Work	 Programme.	 Without	 that	 clear	
mandate,	 and	 induced	 by	 the	 dot-com	 crisis,221	Member	 States	 lost	 interest	 very	 quickly,	
activity	in	the	respective	bodies	waned,	and	momentum	was	lost.	Even	though	momentum	



















both	 until	 very	 recently.222	 Trade	 policy	 makers	 have	 simply	 not	 been	 aware	 of	 Internet	
specific	rules,	implications,	and	needs.		
Until	 very	 recently,	Members	 also	 adopted	 a	 “wait-and-see”	 approach	 instead	 of	 actively	
engaging	in	the	subject.	Few	dispute	settlement	cases	in	relation	to	digital	trade	have	been	
brought	to	the	table	so	far,	but	each	has	brought	significantly	more	clarity	to	open	questions	
than	 20	 years	 of	 work	 in	 the	 Work	 Programme.	 Given	 the	 stalled	 negotiations,	 further	
clarification	on	open	issues	in	relation	to	e-commerce	is	likely	to	happen	in	the	near	future	
only	if	a	Member	files	a	complaint	against	another	Member.	The	WTO	Secretariat	itself	does	
not	have	 the	 right	 to	do	so	 itself,	opposed	 to,	 for	example,	 the	EU	Commission.	However,	
Members	still	hesitate	to	engage	actively	in	disputes	related	to	digital	trade.	It	could	be	argued	
that	this	is	also	partially	due	to	uncertainty	or	lack	of	knowledge	on	this	issue.	
The	 paralysation	 of	 the	 WTO	 has	 created	 a	 vacuum	 and	 legal	 uncertainty	 in	 which	
governments	are	starting	to	impose	barriers	to	digital	trade.	Businesses	cannot	be	sure	to	be	
backed	 by	 international	 WTO	 trade	 rules,	 leading	 to	 hampered	 GDP	 growth	 globally,	 as	
outlined	in	chapter	3.		
With	 fast	 technological	 progress,	 more	 uncertainties	 lay	 ahead,	 such	 as	 implications	 of	
additive	 manufacturing,	 just	 in	 time	 delivery,	 the	 classification	 of	 data	 within	 the	 WTO	
framework,	 the	question	of	data	ownership	and	potential	 abuse,	or	 taxation	of	 the	digital	
economy.	Special	attention	should	be	given	to	newly	evolving	technologies	with	the	potential	
to	disrupt	trade	in	its	traditional	way.	Additive	manufacturing	might	only	be	the	beginning.	
























developed	 regulation	 in	 the	 area	 of	 digital	 trade.	 In	 difference	 to	 the	WTO,	 which	 as	 an	
international	organization	of	cooperation	depends	on	decisions	made	by	its	diverse	Member	
States	in	consensus,	the	EU	is	more	flexible	with	regard	to	imposing	new	rules.	Reasons	for	
this	 include	 a	 solid	 legislating-system	 as	well	 as	 less	 diversity	 between	Member	 States	 in	
comparison	 to	 the	WTO.	With	 the	 European	 Commission,	 the	 EU	 also	 possesses	 its	 own	
administration	 with	 the	 power	 to	 propose	 legislation,	 implement	 decisions,	 and	 monitor	
compliance	 of	 Members.	 The	WTO,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 only	 possesses	 a	 relatively	 small	
secretariat	to	support	the	intergovernmental	work	of	Member	States.	
However,	taking	a	closer	look	at	EU	regulation	and	the	EU	Digital	Single	Market	can	help	to	















content	 across	 the	 EU,	 and	 ensuring	 that	 nation-based	 copyright	 rules	 do	 not	 impede	
innovation	and	research.		
The	 second	 pillar	 aims	 to	 create	 a	 better	 environment	 for	 digital	 networks	 and	 services,	
including	better	access	to	telecoms-services	for	all	EU	citizens	and	businesses.	It	also	focuses	
on	 adapting	 existing	 rules	 for	 audio-visual	 media	 to	 new	 business	 models	 for	 content	
distribution,	analysing	the	role	of	online	platforms,	particularly	with	regard	to	transparency,	





































and	 Progressive	 Agreement	 for	 Trans-Pacific	 Partnership	 (CPTPP),	 the	 new	 version	 of	 the	
formerly	negotiated	Trans-Pacific	Partnership	(TPP).	Especially	the	TPP,	whose	provisions	on	










information	 across	 borders.234	 However,	 like	 the	 GATS,	 the	 CPTPP	 allows	 Parties	 to	 take	
measures	 to	 achieve	 legitimate	public	 policy	 objectives	 (articles	 14.11.3	 and	14.13.3).	 The	
agreement	also	addresses	a	wide	range	of	other	important	issues,	such	as	questions	of	source	














cybersecurity	matters.	Due	 to	 limitations	 in	 space,	and	having	 in	mind	 the	purpose	of	 this	
paper,	a	deeper	analysis	of	provisions	in	the	TPP	will	not	be	made	at	this	point.		
The	important	point	to	make	here	is	twofold:	first,	there	are	international	trade	agreements	
addressing	directly	open	questions	 in	 relation	 to	digital	 trade,	 its	 implications,	and	 related	
issues	in	a	straightforward	way.	Within	these	agreements,	there	is	no	need	for	interpreting	
and	bending	 rules	 from	analogue-ages	 to	make	 them	apt	 to	21st	 century	 trade.	 Important	
topics	are	rather	named	directly.	The	CPTPP	does	not	only	include	provisions	solely	focusing	










of	 a	 service.235	 In	 addition,	 FTAs	 often	 established	 a	 clear	 and	 applicable	 customs	 duty	
moratorium	on	electronic	 transmission,	non-discrimination	and	MFN	treatment,	as	well	as	
clear	rules	for	domestic	regulation	based	on	GATS	article	VI.	By	using	a	negative	list	approach,	
FTAs	have	also	ensured	 the	 inclusion	of	new	services	as	well	as	more	 flexibility.	Mavroidis	
(2017)	additionally	highlights	the	inclusion	of	provisions	against	data	localization	measures	in	
many	FTAs.236		
A	systematic	assessment	of	FTAs	 in	 relation	to	digital	 trade	could	 lead	to	 finding	the	most	


























of	 defining	 the	 concept	 of	 digital	 trade	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 WTO	 could	 be	 seen	 in	
connection	with	the	question	of	applicability	of	WTO	agreements	to	digital	trade.		
From	the	standpoint	of	trade	liberalization,	at	the	first	view,	it	would	be	most	beneficial	to	
categorize	 all	 digitally	 supplied	 products	 as	 products	 ruled	 by	 the	GATT,	while	 all	 services	


























only	 from	 a	 legal,	 but	 also	 from	 a	 political	 perspective.	 If	 consensus	 on	 this	 issue	 is	 not	
achieved,	 the	Panel	and	Appellate	Body	could	 further	examine	 this	 issue	 in	 future	dispute	
























lists	as	done	 in	many	FTAs:	 this	approach	would	 lead	 to	a	widespread	 liberalization	 in	 the	
services	 sector	 as,	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 all	 services	 would	 be	 fully	 scheduled,	 including	 new	
services	as	they	arise.	Governments	could	then	make	restrictions	specifically	to	the	services	
they	 deem	 necessary.	 This	 would	 ensure	 new	 arising	 digital	 services	 to	 be	 automatically	
included	 in	the	schedules	of	all	Members,	 thus,	 leading	to	 further	 liberalization	 in	the	 first	















Another	 possible	 solution	 would	 be	 the	 negotiation	 of	 a	 new	 multilateral	 agreement	 on	
electronic	commerce	as	mentioned	earlier.	However,	besides	other	reservations,	it	can	hardly	

































by	 71	 Member	 States	 at	 MC11	 and	 subsequent	 work	 can	 be	 a	 significant	 step	 into	 this	
direction	but	cannot	be	the	ultimate	solution	as	outlined	in	chapter	8.2.	
Many	Member	 States	 have	 reiterated	 the	 need	 for	 further	 work	 and	 discussions	 to	 fully	














In	 order	 to	 address	 the	 knowledge	 gap	 between	 trade	 policy	makers	 and	 Internet	 policy	
makers,	the	WTO	and	other	organizations	from	the	trade	ambit,	such	as	the	OECD	or	UNCTAD,	





digital	 trade	and	many	questions	 remain	unanswered,	 it	 is	 upon	 the	Members	 to	become	























current	 agenda	 of	 the	WTO,	 further	 research	 and	 work	 within	 the	WTO	 will	 have	 to	 be	







EU	 Digital	 Single	 Market,	 including	 rules	 on	 competition	 and	 stronger	 rules	 on	 non-
discrimination	within	the	WTO	framework,	connecting	digital	trade	with	the	UN	Sustainable	
Development	 Goals	 (SDGs),	 as	 well	 as	 focusing	 on	 rights	 of	 consumers.	 The	 most	 recent	
Facebook	–	Cambridge	Analytica	scandal	has	shown	that	pure	 liberalization	of	digital	trade	
can	lead	to	imbalances	between	businesses,	governments	and	citizens,	especially	regarding	
data.	 Thus,	 providing	 a	 balanced	 framework	 not	 solely	 focusing	 on	 liberalization	 will	 be	
essential.	
Other	issues	to	be	included	could	be	the	development	of	infrastructure	or	the	facilitation	of	



















was	shown	that	 the	WTO	framework	 is	already	well	equipped	to	address	 these	barriers,	 if	
open	key	questions	are	clarified.	The	WTO	as	an	established	multilateral	forum	is	still	the	ideal	
place	for	addressing	new	questions	arising	around	trade,	including	digital	trade.	It	possesses	
widely	 accepted	 core	 principles,	 such	 as	 transparency	 and	 non-discrimination	 between	
Members,	as	well	as	a	–	still	–	solid	dispute	settlement	system.248	As	highlighted,	a	plurilateral	
approach	cannot	be	the	solution	for	answering	basic	questions	regarding	digital	trade.	Even	
though	there	currently	 is	a	 lack	of	progress	at	the	multilateral	 level	regarding	digital	trade,	
FTAs	cannot	be	the	solution	for	determining	binding	rules	for	digital	trade	due	to	the	risk	of	
increased	fragmentation	ultimately	harming	the	multilateral	system.		
This	paper	has	 identified	open	key	open	 issues	 for	 the	WTO	that	need	 to	be	addressed	 in	
relation	 to	 digital	 trade	 and	has	 indicated	 proposals	 for	 possible	 solutions.	 To	 do	 so,	 root	
causes	for	the	current	standstill,	outlined	in	this	paper,	need	be	addressed,	in	order	to	achieve	
progress	more	quickly.	The	GATS,	if	applied,	provides	a	solid	framework	for	addressing	rising	
barriers	 in	 the	digital	 sphere	 as	 this	 paper	 has	 shown,	 even	 though	many	 issues	 could	 be	
addressed	 in	 a	more	 direct	manner,	 if	Members	wished	 to	 do	 so.	While	 the	GATT	would	
provide	 a	more	 liberalized	 regime	 than	 the	GATS,	 its	 application	 in	 regard	 to	digital	 trade	
seems	not	to	be	very	likely	as	Members	would	probably	not	be	willing	to	liberalize	digital	trade	
to	that	extent.	Further	research	on	application	of	GATT	rules	to	e-commerce	is	necessary.	
For	 addressing	 digital	 trade	 in	 a	 comprehensive	 manner,	 widening	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
organization	will	be	necessary	and	further	discussions	on	this	issue	will	have	to	be	held,	going	
beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	The	WTO	is	a	creation	of	nation	states	and	therefore	granting	






























launch	of	 the	Doha	Round,	putting	 the	organization	 in	a	weak	position.	Hard	work	will	be	
necessary	to	make	the	WTO	apt	for	21st	century	challenges,	including	digital	trade,	and	for	the	
organization	to	leave	the	current	crisis	stronger	than	it	has	been	before.	Delivering	results	on	
open	issues	related	to	digital	trade	soon,	inter	alia	based	on	proposals	for	solutions	pointed	
out	in	this	paper,	could	be	one	step	in	this	direction.		
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11.	Annex	
	
Table	1:	Open	basic	issues	for	the	WTO	regarding	digital	trade	and	possible	solutions	
Issues	 Possible	solutions	
Definition	of	e-commerce	/	digital	trade	 - Keep	working	definition		
- If	all	digitally	delivered	products	and	services	
are	to	be	services	subject	to	the	GATS,	no	
further	definition	of	e-commerce	is	necessary	
Need	for	clarification	of	applicability	of	
agreements	
- Classification	of	all	tangible	goods	including	if	
ordered	or	paid	for	via	the	Internet	as	
products	subject	to	GATT	
- Classification	of	all	digitally	delivered	products	
and	services	as	services	subject	to	the	GATS	
- (Possibly:	classification	of	all	digitally	delivered	
products	as	goods	under	the	GATT)	
- (Classification	of	all	other	services	as	services	
subject	to	the	GATS)		
Need	for	clarification	on	GATS	modes	
of	supply	
- Consensus	by	Members	to	classify	as	mode	1	
- Until	agreed	on:	examination	of	different	
modes	of	supply	by	Panel	/	Appellate	Body	in	
next	DS-cases	related	to	digital	trade	
Need	for	Members	to	update	GATS	
schedules	
- Incorporation	of	most	frequent	CPC-list	
- Use	of	a	negative	list	approach	
Need	to	address	rising	barriers	 - If	classification	as	services	under	GATS:	
- Recognize	the	already	existing	provisions	in	
the	GATS,	the	Annex	on	
Telecommunications,	the	4th	protocol	to	the	
GATS,	and	the	Reference	Paper	
- Include	language	in	the	GATS	directly	
addressing	relevant	issues	such	as	data	
localization	measures	based	on	language	
used	in	FTAs	
- (If	classification	under	GATT,	work	would	need	
to	be	carried	out	respectively)	
Source:	Own	elaboration	
	
Table	2:	Root	causes	of	standstill	and	possible	solutions	to	overcome	
Root	causes		 Possible	solutions	
Operating	of	WTO,	including	need	for	
consensus	
Long	term:	WTO	reform	leading	to	a	more	
flexible	and	agile	organization	
Operating	of	the	Work	Programme	 Establish	a	permanent	forum	for	more	active,	
flexible	negotiations	
Mandate	of	the	Work	Programme	 Widen	the	scope	of	the	mandate	including	
provisions	towards	rule-making	
Digital	divide	&	knowledge	gaps	 - Building	a	common	knowledge	between	WTO	
Members	by	capacity	and	capability	building	
through	WTO	Secretariat	and	Members	
advanced	in	digital	trade	
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- Engage	with	Internet	governance	
organizations	in	a	regular,	coordinated	
dialogue	
Members	inactive	leading	to	few	DSB	
cases	
- More	engagement	and	activity	by	Members	in	
the	short-	to	mid-term	until	clarification	is	
achieved	on	a	policy	level	
Narrow	scope	of	the	WTO	/	Trade	
liberalization	focus	of	WTO	
Widen	scope	of	the	WTO	in	the	long-term:	
- Identify	trade	related	issues	of	digital	
economy	with	relevance	for	WTO	possibly	
based	on	proposal	by	the	EU	and	co-
sponsors	(JOB/GC/97/Rev.1)	and	in	close	
work	together	with	other	organizations	
- Develop	more	comprehensive	framework	as	
digitalization	affects	more	and	more	areas	of	
trade	
	
Source:	Own	elaboration	
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